Culture is modeled as a constraint on individual behavior, which makes certain choices taboo. In a multicultural society, we analyze whether coordination can be achieved between culturally diverse groups of agents. When cultural constraints are fixed, miscoordination between cultural groups is the most likely outcome, even where coordination is a Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium. The insights are applied to a model of political decision-making. Political parties with diverging constraints and preferences can fail to compromise on a policy, even where political conflict is costly. When parties can adapt their political cultures, however, compromise is achieved in the long run.
Introduction
Over the last century, a great deal of conflict has occurred along ethnic, religious and ideological lines (e.g. Ferguson 2006 ). The Cold War, religious terrorism, Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, and civil wars in Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Iraq head a long list. Competition for resources is the driving force in many cases and such conflicts are transparently zero-sum contests for power. Though dramatic, zero-sum interactions are rather exceptional in modern societies. There are a range of contexts, from political cooperation in a crisis to establishing social conventions in multicultural societies, in which it is in the parties' interests to cooperate and coordinate their activities. As yet, we do not have a framework for understanding how cultural diversity can lead to the break down of cooperation in such situations. This paper is an attempt to develop such a framework.
Economists have tended to think of culture, if at all, as variation in payoffs (e.g. Bisin & Verdier 2000 . In our setting, however, heterogeneity in payoffs is not enough to destabilize social coordination. We propose an alternative view of culture as a constraint on individual choice: culture is a restriction on an agent's strategy set. Indeed, in matters of trade, politics, diet, dress, language, manners and rules of social deference, people not only compare alternatives, but also rule out some options as culturally impermissible-taboo.
1 We shall address the following questions: Do cultural constraints inhibit coordination between diverse cultural groups? When coordination breaks down, does cultural adaptation eliminate conflict and miscoordination?
To introduce our approach, consider the following strategic context. Two political parties choose whether or not to cooperate in enacting a new policy, say raising the debt ceiling.
There are three options: (A) a bill that increases taxes and and spending, (B) a bill that cuts taxes and spending, and (C) a bill that increases taxes and cuts spending. If the parties back the same bill, then it is passed in a smooth fashion. However, suppose that the parties have different constraints and preferences over which bill to enact. Party 1 rejects option B outright and most prefers option A. Party 2 rejects option A outright and most prefers option B. Hence the parties can only coordinate on C-the compromise 1 For example, Tetlock et al. (2000) find that experimental subjects express moral outrage at even contemplating certain taboo transactions, including buying and selling of human body parts for medical transplant operations, surrogate motherhood contracts, adoption rights for orphans, votes in elections for political office and the right to become a U.S. citizen. People feel that contemplating taboo behavior undermines their image as moral beings both to themselves and other members of society (Fiske & Tetlock 1997). option. It turns out that even when compromise by both parties is (i) a Nash equilibrium, which (ii) Pareto-dominates other equilibria, political conflict could still emerge in which each party fights for its favorite bill. In fact, even when the payoffs to compromise are large (e.g. in a crisis), we shall show that conflict is the most likely outcome of play.
The example of political conflict is a special case of our model, and we will return to it later. We derive our main results in a more general setting, which captures a range of interactions that occur in multicultural societies including:
Work. Coworkers benefit from establishing common workplace conventions, including how many hours to work, standards of dress and appropriate topics for discussion.
Workers from different cultural backgrounds are likely to have different sets of moral commitments and preferences on these issues. Akerlof & Kranton (2010) provide numerous examples of organizational conflict along gender, class and racial lines. We provide one possible framework for understanding identity-based conflict within organizations.
Marriage. Parents benefit from coordinating efforts on how many children to have, what languages to teach their children and in which religion to socialize them, if at all. In exogamous marriages, each partner may reject different options out of hand and have diverging preferences over the remaining options. Perhaps, as a consequence, interracial, interethnic and interreligious marriages are more likely to end in divorce than homogamous marriages (see Fu 2006 , and references therein).
Trade. International business entails not only a choice of contracting form and terms, but also the elaborate performance of social rituals. Choosing the correct number of rounds of golf before raising matters of business or the right kind of cuisine for a business dinner can be important. Both parties would like to coordinate. But each party is likely to have different options in mind and different preferences over the alternatives.
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In our model, agents are drawn from different cultural groups and matched to play a (modified) coordination game. Groups impose different cultural restrictions on members' behavior. In homogenous populations, various analytical approaches to coordination games have pointed to the risk-dominant equilibrium as the likely outcome of play (Harsanyi & Selten 1988 , Kandori et al. 1993 , Young 1993 , Blume 2003 , Carlsson & van Damme 1993 . Coordination failure-the selection of Pareto-dominated coordination equilibriais a well studied phenomenon both theoretically and experimentally (van Huyck et al. 1990) . In this paper, we show that when members of cultural groups choose from differ-2 The subdiscipline of cross-cultural management is devoted to these issues. ent (but overlapping) strategy sets, a new and even worse outcome can emerge, which we refer to as miscoordination. Play might not settle into any coordination equilibrium, even though every coordination equilibrium Pareto dominates miscoordination.
Miscoordination arises in a standard evolutionary setting in which boundedly rational agents best respond to samples of play from recent history (Young 1993 (Young , 1998 . Equilibrium selection is undertaken using techniques from stochastic evolutionary game theory (Foster & Young 1990 , Kandori et al. 1993 , Young 1993 , Ellison 2000 . We find that miscoordination is the unique stochastically stable outcome-the most likely outcome of play-for an open set of parameters. Miscoordination by agents who choose from different strategy sets is not an artifact of myopic choice or other features of our evolutionary setting. It is a more general phenomenon that can arise in variety of settings, including static games played by fully rational players (see section 4.3).
As Sen (2006) has noted, cultural inheritance is not destiny, and culture may eventually adapt in response to economic and social incentives. We study whether cultural adaptation shapes the evolution of social coordination. Indeed, cultural adaptation eliminates recurrent miscoordination even when cultural groups are highly intransigent (i.e. rarely revise their cultural constraints). For example, political conflict gives way to compromise in the long run, as political cultures adapt. Intransigence can, however, shape the direction of coordination.
In the short run, a restrictive and intransigent cultural group can enjoy a strategic advantage, as other groups loosen their cultural constraints to coordinate with it. Hence cultural restrictions play the role of a strategic commitment and can improve the welfare of members by limiting their options. The idea that precommitment can yield a strategic advantage is well established in game theory due to Schelling (1960) . It has found applications in industrial organization (e.g. Spence 1977 , Dixit 1979 , international relations and many other fields. However, the view of group membership as a strategic commitment has not featured in theories of culture. This is the first paper to our knowledge to propose such a role for culture. We proceed to show, however, that the strategic advantage enjoyed by restrictive cultures tends to disappear in the long run as evolutionary pressures favor more 'egalitarian' outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our notion of culture as a constraint on individual choice and reviews related literature. Section 3 sets out the basic version of our model, while Section 4 analyzes the conditions under which coordination breaks down between members of different cultural groups. In Section 5, we study how cultural adaptation shapes social coordination. Section 6 concludes.
2 Modeling Culture 2.1 Culture as a Constraint Boyd & Richerson (1985) define culture as "the transmission from one generation to the next, via teaching or imitation, of knowledge, values and other factors that influence behavior" [p. 2] . Prior work has generally interpreted cultural values as being expressed by payoffs (see Bisin & Verdier 2000 , Kuran & Sandholm 2008 . We explore an alternative view in this paper, that culture acts as a constraint on individual choice by ruling out certain actions. This is in keeping with a longstanding literature on what Sen (1977) calls "commitments" and Harsanyi (1982) calls "moral values." Sen (1977) explains that "in a broader sense [commitments] We suggest that cultural constraints on individual choice arise from the internalization of culturally defined standards of 'right' and 'wrong' behavior, through the process of socialization (e.g. Child 1943 , Durkheim 1953 , Merton 1957 . 4 According to Coleman (1990) , the internalization of behavioral norms means that individuals come to have an "internal sanctioning system" which provides punishment when they violate standards of acceptable behavior [p. 293] . In other words, individuals incur a psychological cost from taking actions that are deemed to be wrong (e.g. Frank 1988 , Elster 1989 , Akerlof & Kranton 2000 . 5 In addition, Frank (1988) argues that emotions such as shame, guilt, and anger enforce moral commitments, making credible the carrying out of threats and 3 For example, Tetlock et al. (2000) find that moral outrage at taboo transactions varies across subjects in a systematic way, depending on agents' political attitudes. 4 Henrich et al. (2004) present evidence of the internalization of culturally defined standards of behavior from their experiments in 15 small-scale societies spread over five continents. 5 We do not explicitly model this psychological loss here. Of course, there may be other forces which preserve these rules of conduct, such as the imposition of sanctions by the community, which we do not model here. Nevertheless, as Rao & Walton (2004) claim regarding the ubiquitous incest taboo (e.g. Freud 1950 ), "[m]ost people would not consider breaking it, not just because of fear of social sanctions, but simply because the taboo is so deeply ingrained within their psyches" [p. 15]. promises even when it is not in a person's material interest to do so. Clearly, individuals do not always adhere to cultural restrictions, and deviant behavior is observed in real social settings. Nevertheless, individuals that reject social controls and experience no guilt or remorse when transgressing socially acceptable standards of behavior constitute only 3-4 per cent of the male population and less than 1 per cent of the female population in the United States (Mealey 1995) . These individuals are known as sociopaths (or psychopaths) in the literature.
Related Research
Economics has recently taken a cultural turn. Culture has been linked empirically to a variety of economic decisions, from occupational choice and savings decisions (Guiso et al. 2006) , to female labor supply decisions (Fernández 2007) , shirking (Ichino & Maggi 2000) and corruption (Fisman & Miguel 2007) . The strategic role of culture, however, has been largely ignored. Notable exceptions are Greif (1993 Greif ( , 1994 The paper closest in spirit to ours is by Kuran & Sandholm (2008) . As in our model, social interactions take the form of a coordination game and agents have idiosyncratic preferences over actions. In their model, however, agents have continuous strategy sets and compromise between their ideal action and the action that yields the largest coordination payoff. Most importantly, culture in Kuran & Sandholm's model does not restrict an agent's strategy set.
6 As agents choose from the same strategy set, there is no breakdown of Pareto-efficient coordination. Another point of difference is that Kuran & Sandholm assume preferences evolve so that an agent's ideal action converges to their actual action over time. In our model, individual preferences remain fixed and it is agents' strategy sets which may evolve.
3 The Model
Social Interactions
Players. We analyze a recurrent game, in which there are n roles that may be filled by a changing cast of players (Jackson & Kalai 1997 , Young 1998 . 7 For convenience, we speak of n players (rather than roles), where n ≥ 2 and finite. The set of players is denoted by N , with members indexed by i.
Cultures. Each player belongs to one of two groups. Each group has a different culture which is shared by its members. A player belonging to cultural group k is referred to as a k-member. The set of k-members is N k , where |N k | = n k > 0 for k = 1, 2 and n 1 + n 2 = n. Each culture has its own visible marker, and matched individuals observe each others' cultural markers prior to selecting an action.
Actions. The set X, with cardinality L ≥ 3, is the set of all pure strategies that can potentially be taken in a two-player game. The main assumption in this paper is that culture restricts individual choice:
Condition 1. (Cultural Constraints) A k-member in period t chooses from the set of culturally permissible pure strategies, X k , when interacting in period t.
Such a restriction on an agent's strategy set might come about through the internalization of culturally accepted standards of behavior during socialization, or as a result of sanctions imposed by the group, though we do not model this process here.
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Payoffs. Players in social interactions benefit from coordinating their actions but may prefer to coordinate on different equilibria. Formally, payoffs in social interactions are given by u i : X i × X j → R, for i, j ∈ N . We assume u i satisfies the usual von NeumannMorgenstern axioms and takes the following form:
7 Over time, we can think of players "dying" and their roles being filled by incoming players who inherit their predecessor's culture. Consider for example political succession.
8 All our results would hold if we assumed that for each k-member, action x is strictly dominated if and only if x / ∈ X k . We shall not emphasize this interpretation in the exposition, but the reader may care to keep it in mind.
In this formulation, each player gets an interactive payoff, which is normalized to one for coordination and zero for miscoordination, and an idiosyncratic payoff which she receives regardless of the other player's action. The idiosyncratic payoff to action x represents a player's predisposition to taking action x.
We say that player i "most prefers" an actionx, ifx ∈ argmax x∈X δ i,x . We treat an individual's idiosyncratic preferences as exogenous and private information to that individual.
We impose the following non-degeneracy condition [ND] on idiosyncratic preferences to ensure that all social interactions take the form of a coordination game:
Condition 2. (ND) δ i,x − δ i,x < 1 for all players i and for all actions x, x ∈ X.
When ND is violated, there are strategies that are dominated for some players. Since we are interested in coordination, we restrict our attention to preference distributions that satisfy ND. Other than this mild condition, heterogeneity in preferences is unrestricted. When δ i,x = 0 for all players i and actions x, all social interactions take the form of a pure coordination game. When individual preferences are heterogeneous and condition ND is satisfied, then social interactions take the form of a coordination game with conflicting interests, exemplified by the Battle of the Sexes.
Adaptive Choice
Timing. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 1, 2, 3, . . . Each period, one player from group 1 and one player from group 2 are selected to engage in a social interaction. Every player in group 1 and 2 is selected with positive probability.
Information. A player selected to play a coordination game needs to form an expectation of her partner's strategic behavior. This could be done in several ways, but we are especially interested in contexts in which boundedly rational agents have limited, fragmented information and precedent weighs heavily in decisions. Hence we adopt Young's (1993) adaptive play formulation. This also has the significant virtue of selecting between different equilibria.
In particular, we assume that players base their expectations on the prior plays of their partner's cultural group. In concrete terms, we can think of people asking around about the experiences of other individuals in earlier periods.
9 Let play in period t be denoted by the action-tuple
, where x t k is the action of the k-member in period t.
Histories. The (bounded) history in period t is denoted by
which is the record of play in the m previous interactions.
The member of group 1 selected to play in period t draws a sample of size s (without replacement) from the history h t , and specifically from the last m actions taken by 2-members. The 2-member selected to play does the same, except that she samples from the actions taken by 1-members in the m previous periods.
Choice. Agents are boundedly rational, in the sense that they myopically maximize their expected current period payoff when choosing a pure strategy. The k-member (say i) selected to play in period t then calculates the proportion p(x) of plays of x in her sample, for each x ∈ X k . She adopts this as an estimate of the behavioral strategy to be used by her partner. Therefore, her expected payoff from playing action x in is
. This in turn yields the set of pure strategies, argmax x∈X k {p(x) + δ i,x }, which maximize player i's expected current period payoff, given her sample information. With high probability (1 − ε), i chooses one of these strategies. (When there are ties, each best reply is played with equal probability.) With low probability ε, i instead chooses an action in X k at random, for reasons outside of the model.
Conventions.
A convention is a strict Nash equilibrium that has been played by the entire population for as long as anyone can remember (Young 1993 ). This means that any possible sample drawn from the history of play will be identical, and yield the same best reply, namely the conventional action itself. Let x * = (x, x) ∈ X 1 × X 2 be a strict Nash (coordination) equilibrium of a coordination game. 10 We define a convention as follows:
Convention. A convention is a history h * x in which the strict Nash equilibrium x * = (x, x) is played in the last m periods.
Unlike standard models, we shall show that there are conditions under which conventions fail to form. We characterize such a state of miscoordination as follows:
Dynamical Process
As individuals interact recurrently, their adaptive behavior gives rise to a particular dynamical process at the population level. The state in period t is the (bounded) history of play h t . The associated state space is Z = (X 1 × X 2 ) m , where (X) m denotes the m-fold product of X. Clearly, Z is finite for finite K and m. We assume that the process begins in some arbitrary initial state h 0 . There are well-defined, time-homogeneous transition probabilities between all pairs of states h, h , denoted by P h,h . Therefore, the adaptive process we have defined is a finite Markov chain, with a |Z| × |Z| transition probability matrix P m,s,ε . For convenience, we will denote the unperturbed (ε = 0) process by P 0 and the perturbed process by P ε .
P ε is a regular perturbed Markov process (Young 1993) . When ε > 0, all pairs of states communicate, so the process P ε is irreducible. This implies that the process has a unique recurrence class, the entire state space, so the Markov chain is ergodic, i.e. its limiting distribution is independent of the initial state h 0 . Moreover, the Markov process P ε has a unique stationary distribution µ ε . The perturbed process is aperiodic, since there is a positive probability of remaining in any given state. This implies that not only does the relative frequency with which a state h is visited up through time t converge to the frequency given by the unique stationary distribution µ, but so does the probability of being in state h at time t, provided that t is sufficiently large. We rely on the following equilibrium concept due to Foster & Young (1990) :
Stochastic Stability. A state is stochastically stable if it is in the support of µ = lim ε→0 µ ε .
Coordination and Miscoordination
In this section, we focus on social interactions when cultural constraints are fixed and ask: Can members of different cultural groups learn to coordinate with each other?
The Possibility of Long-Run Miscoordination
Let us begin by examining the long-run behavior of the unperturbed Markov process P 0 .
In this way, we can isolate the effect on the evolution of play of (a) cultural restrictions on individual behavior, and (b) substantial heterogeneity in individual preferences.
In a moment, we will show that social conventions which coordinate individual behavior can emerge despite substantial heterogeneity in agents' preferences. However, when the groups have different cultural restrictions, a new possibility arises in which coordination permanently breaks down. It is obvious that coordination is impossible in the following case:
Radical Opposition. The two cultures are radically opposed if X 1 ∩ X 2 = ∅.
However, miscoordination can arise even where coordination is possible. Label the mutu-
A k-member i maximizes her idiosyncratic payoff, without regard to coordination, if she simply chooses a most preferred and permissible action in argmax x∈X k δ i,x . Let the set of such actions for all members of group k beX k = {x | x ∈ argmax x∈X k δ i,x for some
We can now define a further pairwise relation on the set of cultures:
Weak Opposition. The cultures are weakly opposed
If the cultures are radically opposed, then they are also weakly opposed, sinceX 1 ⊆ X 1 andX 2 ⊆ X 2 . The converse is not true; weak opposition unlike radical opposition depends on the distribution of idiosyncratic preferences in a cultural group.
Define the set M = (X 1 ×X 2 ) m . When the cultures are weakly opposed,X 1 ∩ X 2 = ∅ andX 2 ∩X 1 = ∅, so each state in M is a state of miscoordination (see section 3.2). Recall that a recurrence class of a Markov process is a set of states, each of which is accessible from any other state within the class, and for which no state outside the class is accessible from any state within the class. To emphasize that it is cultural constraints, and not heterogeneity in payoffs, that generate miscoordination, note that when X 1 = X 2 , so that the cultures are not weakly opposed, coordination is achieved in the long run with probability one. This generalizes a result of Young's (1998, Theorem 4 .1) to the case in which payoffs can vary within as well as between groups and to coordination games with more than two actions. It also extends the analysis of Myatt & Wallace (2004) who study 2 × 2 coordination games in which idiosyncratic payoffs are drawn from a normal distribution.
Most importantly, in a multicultural society, cultural restrictions on individual choice can cause coordination between members of different cultural groups to permanently break down even where it need not, and even though coordination is Pareto-efficient. Permanent miscoordination arises after a string of failed social interactions, which leads members of each cultural group to lose confidence that members of the outgroup will coordinate with them. To understand why play can get stuck in this Pareto-dominated equilibrium suppose that the process is in a state of miscoordination. For all possible samples, both individuals selected to play expect that the probability of coordinating is zero. As far as they know, members of the other group have always taken actions that are impermissible for them. Therefore, both individuals play one of their most preferred actions. Weak opposition means that no most preferred action is in X 1 ∩ X 2 , so the process remains in a state of miscoordination. If, however, the cultures are not weakly opposed, then with positive probability at least one player will take a mutually permissible action (in X 1 ∩ X 2 ), so that the process exits from a state of miscoordination, and a convention can emerge.
Once the model is set up, the result is clear. Yet we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to identify this long-run possibility of miscoordination.
Stochastically Stable Miscoordination
What certainly is surprising is the stability of miscoordination. As long as the cultures are not radically opposed, the conventions remain recurrence classes of P 0 . So we might expect recurrent miscoordination to be a tenuous phenomenon. In this section, we employ the stochastic stability framework to show that, on the contrary, recurrent miscoordination is the most likely outcome of play in the long run for open set of parameters.
For this analysis, we introduce the possibility that players make a mistake or engage in random experimentation with probability ε > 0. This gives rise to the perturbed process P ε . Taking the limit ε → 0 allows us to make sharp statements about the asymptotic behavior of P ε . We will also make use of two new conditions on the distribution of individual preferences that will jointly determine the stability of recurrent miscoordination.
First, let us define what we shall call the weakest idiosyncratic preference for miscoordination M. This will determine the minimum number of errors it takes for the process to exit the basin of attraction of M. Recall that X 1 ∩ X 2 = {x 1 , . . . x , . . . x L }. Define:
Intuitively, δ 1, represents the weakest idiosyncratic preference for miscoordination over coordination on x , among 1-members. Similarly, we can define the corresponding variable for 2-members, δ 2, = min i∈N 2 (max x ∈X 2 \X 1 δ i,x − δ i,x ). Let δ = min{δ 1, , δ 2, } represent the weakest idiosyncratic preference for miscoordination over coordination on x , among all players. Then δ = min 1≤ ≤L δ represents the weakest idiosyncratic preference for miscoordination. We claim that the cultures are weakly opposed if and only if δ > 0.
To verify the claim, suppose δ ≤ 0. Then for some player i, say in group 1, there exists a mutually permissible action x such that δ i,x ≥ δ i,x for all x ∈ X 1 \X 2 . But that means that at least one of i's most preferred actions is a mutually permissible action, i.e.
X 1 ∩ X 2 = ∅, so the cultures are not weakly opposed.
Second, let us define what we shall call the strongest idiosyncratic preference for miscoordination M. This will determine the minimum number of errors it takes for the process to enter the basin of attraction of M. Let:
Define δ 2, similarly. Also, let δ = max{δ 1, , δ 2, }. Then δ = min 1≤ ≤L δ represents the strongest idiosyncratic preference for miscoordination. To see this suppose that δ 1, < δ 2, and δ 1, > δ 2, for all , 1 ≤ ≤ L (this simplifies the condition somewhat for inspection).
In this case:
We now demonstrate that when the weakest and strongest idiosyncratic preference for miscoordination are sufficiently intense, then miscoordination is the most likely outcome of play:
Proposition 2 Suppose the cultures are weakly opposed and s/m ≤ 1/2. If δ + δ > 1, then for s (and m) sufficiently large, recurrent miscoordination M is the unique stochastically stable class of P ε .
The intuition behind the result is as follows. The mutually permissible actions yield high payoffs when everyone coordinates on them, i.e. when a convention is in place.
However, these actions yield low payoffs out of equilibrium, if agents most prefer actions that are mutually impermissible. In this case, relatively few deviations can destabilize an established convention and the process can remain in a state of miscoordination for some time. Out-of-equilibrium behavior is thus important.
The proportion of time the process spends in miscoordination depends on how easy it is to enter the basin of attraction of M (i.e. how large is δ) and how difficult it is to exit the basin of attraction of M (i.e. how large is δ). Therefore, when δ + δ is sufficiently high, it is difficult to exit the basin of attraction of M and/or easy to enter it. So as ε → 0, P ε spends virtually all of the time as t → ∞ in M, regardless of where the process begins.
We have demonstrated that if s (and m) are sufficiently large, 13 then δ +δ > 1 guarantees that individuals miscoordinate virtually all of the time. We remark that this condition is not necessary for recurrent miscoordination to be stochastically stable. Nevertheless, it is stronger than weak opposition alone (i.e. δ > 0).
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Example: Culture & Political Conflict
Let us now revisit the example of political conflict to illustrate two points: (i) the condition δ + δ > 1 holds in plausible cases and (ii) the phenomenon of miscoordination does not depend on our particular evolutionary setting. Recall that party 1 rejects option B outright and most prefers A, while party 2 rejects option A outright and most prefers B.
Suppose that if a party chooses the compromise option C it gets a payoff of one if the other party also chooses to compromise and zero otherwise. If party 1 chooses instead to fight for its most preferred bill, it wins with probability ω 1 and receives a payoff of y 1 .
If it loses it receives a payoff of zero. Similarly, if party 2 chooses to fight for its most preferred bill, it wins with probability ω 2 and receives a payoff of y 2 . If it loses it again receives a payoff of zero. Suppose that ω 1 y 1 < 1 and ω 2 y 2 < 1 so that cooperating to pass the compromise bill is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Figure 1 is the reduced payoff matrix, with each party's impermissible strategies deleted.
B C
A ω 1 y A1 , ω 2 y 2 ω 1 y 1 , 0 C 0, ω 2 y 2 1, 1 Figure 1 : Conflict or compromise.
For convenience, suppose that the expected payoff from fighting for one's most preferred option is positive and the same for both parties, i.e. ω 1 y 1 = ω 2 y 2 ≡ δ. The political cultures are weakly opposed because δ > 0. Hence, when the game is played by boundedly rational agents in our evolutionary setting, the history consisting solely of plays of 13 As s grows large, it is necessary that m grows large, because s ≤ m.
14 By condition N D, δ < 1. Therefore, δ + δ > 1 implies that δ > 0.
(A, B), i.e. miscoordination M, is a recurrence class of P 0 by Proposition 1. The "symmetry" of preferences implies that the strongest and weakest idiosyncratic preferences for miscoordination are the same, that is δ = δ = δ. Therefore, as we establish in the proof of Proposition 2 [see (8)], M is the unique stochastically stable class if:
The right hand side of (1) goes to 1 2 as s → ∞. Therefore, for sample size s sufficiently large, the expected payoff from fighting for one's most preferred option δ only needs to be more than half the payoff from compromising, for M to be the unique stochastically stable class of P ε . Hence, miscoordination-in this context political conflict-is the most likely outcome of play for an open set of preferences.
As we claimed earlier, this is a more general idea that could, for example, be expressed in the context of a static game played by fully rational players. By inspection of Figure 1 , the coordination equilibrium (C, C) is a Nash equilibrium because ω 1 y 1 < 1 and ω 2 y 2 < 1 by assumption. However, the pair (A, B), which represents miscoordination, is also a strict Nash equilibrium when ω 1 y 1 > 0 and ω 2 y 2 > 0. The intuition is that when no player expects coordination to be achieved, each player maximizes their idiosyncratic payoff alone when making a choice. If idiosyncratic payoffs are maximized by mutually impermissible actions, then miscoordination results. Moreover, in the symmetric case when ω 1 y 1 = ω 2 y 2 ≡ δ, (A, B) is the strictly risk-dominant equilibrium if and only if δ > 1/2, and thus we might expect miscoordination to be the most likely outcome of play by rational agents in this case (Harsanyi & Selten 1988) . Our evolutionary analysis of course goes beyond this by specifying an out-of-equilibrium process for play that converges to miscoordination, in larger coordination games with greater heterogeneity in preferences.
Does Cultural Adaption Resolve Conflict?
In this section, we shall examine whether cultural adaptation eliminates miscoordination and, if so, whether restrictive cultures shape the evolution of social coordination. The setup is the same as in Section 3, except that in each period, prior to agents choosing their actions, one cultural group is selected to revise its culture. If group k is selected, it is able to choose a new set of permissible actions X k with probability 1 − σ k < 1.
Otherwise, its culture is unchanged. We interpret σ k as the intransigence of group k.
Cultural adaption occurs if σ k < 1 for some k = 1, 2.
If group k is selected and able to revise its culture, then it draws a sample of size s from the most recent history h t . Let the frequency of action x in this sample be p(x). Define
as the set of action sets that would maximize i's expected payoff in the current period, given the sample information. When revising, we assume that group k chooses a culture
Ψ ik , each with positive probability. 15, 16 In other words, for a group to revise its culture, there must be unanimous support for such a change among its members. Even this rather conservative revision protocol can dramatically change the evolution of social coordination. In the long run, miscoordination is eliminated.
Proposition 3 With cultural adaptation, P 0 converges almost surely to a convention.
The proof is straightforward and can be stated here. Firstly, note that Ψ k contains the 'global' strategy set X because max x∈X p(x) + δ i,x ≥ max x∈X k p(x) + δ i,x for all i and X k ⊆ X. Therefore, either one of the groups can revise its culture to X without an error.
If this occurs, then the cultures are no longer weakly opposed. In the absence of further cultural changes for a sufficiently large number of periods, P 0 converges to a convention in finite time (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix). For any finite number of periods, there is a positive probability that there is no (further) cultural change. Hence from any state, there is a positive probability of transiting to a convention.
All that remains is to show that a convention is an absorbing state. We know that this is true absent cultural change (see Lemma 1 in the Appendix). Suppose an x-convention is in place. The only way it can be destabilized then is if group k switches to a culture X k that does not contain x (i.e. in which x is taboo). However, by doing so members of k give up a coordination payoff of one for an idiosyncratic payoff differential of less than one (by Condition N D). Our cultural revision protocol rules out such a change. Therefore, each convention is an absorbing state, and indeed the conventions are the only recurrence classes of P 0 . Hence coordination is achieved in the long run despite potential differences in culture and substantial heterogeneity in preferences. It also occurs regardless of the 15 As we shall see, Ψ k is nonempty.
16 So the choice of culture and its attending constraints are based partly on material interests, when interactive payoffs are interpreted as being materially based. There are numerous instances one can cite in which moral sentiments are shaped by material interests. For example, the Puritans who settled Providence Island off the coast of Nicaragua were lured by the sizable profits from trade in plantation crops to abandon their original ideals and become slave owners (Bowles 2004, p.4) . Both the temporally dislocated Spartan and Venetian aristocracies took to polyandry in response to the taxation of separate households, which were legally deemed to be created upon marriage. So brothers saved on taxes by sharing a wife (Jones 2006). intransigence of the groups, as long as σ k < 1 for some k = 1, 2. Some questions remain: To which convention does the process transit to? Does cultural intransigence shape social coordination? Can restrictive cultures survive evolutionary selection?
To get at these questions we study the following more general formulation of our example of political conflict. Recall that the three policy options are: (A) a bill that increases taxes and and spending, (B) a bill that cuts taxes and spending, and (C) a bill that increases taxes and cuts spending. Let us represent payoffs over the three options in Figure 2 as follows. We continue to impose Condition N D. We also assume, in the spirit of our example,
Let us begin with the cultural constraints analyzed in Section 4.3, X 1 = (A, C) and X 2 = (B, C). Consider a state of political conflict, in which (A, B) has been played throughout recent history. Suppose group 1 is able to revise its culture. If it switches to a culture that permits the choice of B, then it can coordinate with members of group 2 and receive an expected payoff of 1 + δ B , which is greater than δ A by Condition N D.
Therefore, group 1 would switch and the conflict would be resolved. Similarly, group 2 would if given the chance switch to a culture that permits A in order to coordinate with members of group 1. In both cases, one group gets to play its most preferred action, while the other group compromises by loosening its cultural restrictions. The more intransigent the group, the more likely it is to get its way and lead coordination onto its most preferred action. Hence cultural restrictions play the role of a strategic commitment and can improve the welfare of members by limiting their options (Schelling 1960 ).
There is a twist, however. The strategic advantage enjoyed by a restrictive culture is a short-run phenomenon in this context. The perturbed process P ε can tip out of the intransigent group's most preferred convention and into other possible conventions. As ε → 0, one can show that the process spends virtually all the time in the (C, C) convention in the long run, independently of the degree of intransigence of the groups σ 1 and σ 2 .
Young (1998, ch. 9) presents some more general equilibrium selection results (without cultural constraints). His basic insights apply here. The (C, C) convention is chosen because it is the "maximin convention" in the sense that it maximizes the payoff of the player who is worst off under the convention relative to her most preferred convention.
17
Hence, cultural adaptation leads to political compromise. In the long run, intransigent groups with restrictive cultures do not destabilize social coordination, nor do they enjoy a strategic advantage by inducing coordination on their most preferred option.
Conclusion
This paper has studied how cultural constraints on behavior affect coordination between diverse groups of agents. When cultures are fixed, we have shown that the Paretodominated outcome of recurrent miscoordination can emerge and be remarkably stable.
However, cultural adaptation establishes coordination in the long run. Though we have emphasized the role of culture in social and political coordination, our model can be applied to a range of settings, including product standardization, coordination with downstream firms and other forms of macroeconomic coordination. To illustrate this point, consider two railway operators settling on a standard gauge in order to connect their lines (a problem of genuine concern in the 19th century). Suppose there are three gauges A, B and C. In addition, suppose that choosing gauge B is a strictly dominated strategy for operator 1 (it is simply too costly to switch from its existing gauge), while choosing gauge A is a strictly dominated strategy for operator 2. Our analysis, shows that even if coordination on gauge C is a Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, it could be unlikely to emerge. Standardization might eventually be achieved, however, if operators can invest over time in lowering switching costs.
17 Such conventions are difficult to destabilize because they maximize the payoff loss from switching to a new strategy, when the equilibrium is in place, for the player who bears the lowest cost of switching. Proof. To establish part (i), recall that a best reply for a 1-member is an action
where x ∈ X 1 ∩X 2 . So a convention can only arise if X 1 ∩X 2 = ∅, that is when the cultures are not radically opposed. Without loss of generality, suppose an x convention is in place.
Then for all possible samples from h * x drawn by a 1-member, the sample proportion of x plays is p(x) = 1 and the sample proportion of x plays is p(x ) = 0 for all x = x. Hence the expected payoff from playing action x to a representative 1-member i, for all possible samples when an x convention is in place, is p(x) + δ i,x = 1 + δ i,x . The expected payoff from playing any action x = x is δ i,x . According to condition ND, |δ i,x − δ i,x | < 1 for all players i and for all actions x, x ∈ X. This implies that 1 + δ i,x > δ i,x for all i and x . Therefore, the unique best reply for any i ∈ N is always x when an x convention is in place. In the unperturbed case (ε = 0) we are considering, there is a zero probability that a non-best reply is played. So no matter which players are drawn, the successor state to a convention ((x, x), (x, x), . . . (x, x)) is certainly ((x, x), (x , x), . . . (x, x)), and each convention is an absorbing state (i.e. a singleton recurrence class).
We shall now establish part (ii). We know that when the cultures are weakly opposed
m is a state of miscoordination. Now consider such a state in M. For all possible samples drawn by 1-member from a state of miscoordination, the sample proportion of action x is zero for all x ∈ X 1 , since all plays by 2-members in such a history are not in X 1 . Therefore, the best reply for all 1-members to a state of miscoordination is always to choose an action in argmax x∈X 1 δ i,x ⊆X 1 . Similarly, the best reply for all 2-members to a state of miscoordination is always to choose an action in argmax x∈X 2 δ i,x ⊆X 2 . Hence once a state of miscoordination is reached, the actiontuple played in the next period is certainly inX 1 ×X 2 , and can be any pair inX 1 ×X 2 .
This implies that no state outside M = (X 1 ×X 2 ) m is accessible from any state in M.
Furthermore, every state in M is accessible from every other state in M. Hence M is a recurrence class of P 0 if the cultures are weakly opposed.
Notice that if the cultures are not weakly opposed, then there exists an action x ∈
possible samples from such a state which can be drawn by a 2-member, consist of s plays of x ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 . It follows from the proof of Lemma 2, case 1, that P 0 transits from this point to the x convention with positive probability in at most another m periods. By part (i), each convention is an absorbing state. Therefore, if the cultures are not weakly opposed, then M is not a recurrence class, unless it is simply the x convention.
Lemma 2 If s/m ≤ 1/2, then a set of states Z ⊂ Z is a recurrence class of P 0 only if it is a convention or M.
Proof. To establish the Lemma, it suffices to show that there is a positive probability of transiting from any state to a convention or a state in M in a finite number of periods.
Consider the situation at some arbitrary time t + 1. There is a positive probability that a particular player i ∈ N 1 is selected to play in s consecutive periods, and that i draws the same sample, which we denote by (
There is also a positive probability that i plays the same best reply, say x , in the s consecutive periods from period t + 1 to t + s. So in period t + s + 1, the 2-member sampling from the most recent m plays by a 1-member up to period t + s, has a positive probability of drawing the sample (x , x , . . . x ), comprised solely of s plays of x . There are then two cases to consider.
(By definition, if the cultures are radically opposed, then
x ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 is impossible.) Condition ND guarantees that x is the unique best reply to the sample (x , x , . . . x ) for all 2-members. There is a positive probability that player i ∈ N 1 is again selected to play in period t + s + 1, that she draws the same sample 2s] , and that she plays the same best reply x to this sample. Therefore, there is a positive probability that the action-tuple played in period t+s+1 will be (x , x ). Since at the end of this period, the last s consecutive plays by the 1-member are of x , the 2-member selected in period t + s + 2 has a positive probability of again drawing a sample comprised of s plays of x , to which the unique best reply is
x .
Now consider the 1-member. There is a positive probability that player i ∈ N 1 is again selected to play in period t + s + 2. Denote the history of the most recent m plays by 2-members in period t + s + 1 by (x 1 , x, . . .). Once the 2-member drawn in period t + s + 1 plays action x , the corresponding period t + s + 2 history is (x, . . . x ). The only change in the history is that x 1 is dropped and x is added. If As such, there is a positive probability that the action-tuple played in period t + s + 2 is again (x , x ). Iterating this argument, the process P 0 transits with positive probability to the convention h * x = ((x , x ), . . . (x , x )) in at most m − 2 additional periods. Notice that we have not relied on the cultures not being weakly opposed, at any stage. Hence this result applies whenever the cultures are weakly, but not radically opposed.
Case 2(a). x / ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 and the cultures are not weakly opposed. Then there exists
There is a positive probability that i ∈ N 2 is selected in period t+s+1, and draws the sample (x , x , . . . x ).
For this sample, p(x ) = 1. Since x ∈ X 1 (because x was taken by a 1-member), and
x / ∈ X 2 (because x ∈ X 1 and x / ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 ), p(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X 2 . Therefore, the expected payoff from any permissible action x ∈ X 2 for i is p(x) + δ i ,x = δ i ,x . As such, the best reply to this sample for i involves simply maximizing her idiosyncratic payoff by choosing an action in argmax x∈X 2 δ i ,x . By hypothesis there exists such an action, saỹ
x, in X 1 ∩ X 2 . So there is a positive probability that i plays actionx in period t + s + 1.
There is also a positive probability that i is selected to play in the next s consecutive periods, that she draws the same sample (x , x , . . . x ) in each of those periods (since m ≥ 2s), and that she plays the same best replyx on each occasion. Then in period t + 2s + 1, there is a positive probability that the 1-member selected to play draws the sample (x,x, . . .x). Sincex ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 , we are now in case 1, and there is a positive probability of transiting to thex convention in at most another m periods.
Case 2(b). x / ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 and the cultures are weakly opposed. Again, there is a positive probability that the 2-member i selected in period t + s + 1 plays the best replỹ x ∈ argmax x∈X 2 δ i ,x to the sample (x , x , . . . x , ). Only nowx / ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 . Consider the 1-member. There is a positive probability that player i ∈ N 1 is again selected in period t + s + 1, that i draws the same sample (x −s , x −s+1 , . . . x −1 ) [since m ≥ 2s], and that she again plays the best reply x . Therefore, there is a positive probability that the action-tuple played in period t + s + 1 is (x ,x).
In period t + s + 2, there is a positive probability that player i ∈ N 2 is again selected to play. Since in this period, the last s consecutive plays by the 1-member are of x , there is a positive probability that i again draws a sample comprised of s plays of x , and that she again playsx in response. There is also a positive probability that player i ∈ N 1 is again selected to play in period t + s + 2. Denote the history of the most recent m plays by 2-members in period t + s + 1 by (x 1 , x, . . .). Once the 2-member drawn in period t + s + 1 plays actionx, the corresponding period t + s + 2 history is (x, . . .x). The only change in the history is that x 1 is dropped andx is added. If x 1 = x −s , then player i can once again draw the sample (x −s , x −s+1 , . . . x −1 ), and play the same best reply x to this sample. If
this implies that the sample (x −s+1 , . . . x −1 ,x) does not contain a greater frequency of any action x ∈ X 1 than does (x −s , x −s+1 , . . . x −1 ). Since x / ∈ X 2 by hypothesis, the expected payoff from action x is always δ i,x . Together with the preceding, this implies that if x is a best reply for i to the sample (x −s , x −s+1 , . . . x −1 ), then it is also a best reply to (x −s+1 , . . . x −1 ,x). As such, there is a positive probability that the action-tuple played in period t + s + 2 is again (x ,x). Iterating this argument, the process P 0 transits with positive probability to the state ((x ,x), . . . (x ,x)) in at most another s − 2 periods.
Since x / ∈ X 2 andx / ∈ X 1 , this is a state of miscoordination. All best replies to a state of miscoordination are inX 1 ×X 2 . Therefore, P 0 transits from this point to a state in M with probability one in at most m additional periods.
Proof of Proposition 2.
By Proposition 1, when the cultures are radically opposed, M is the unique recurrence class of P 0 . This directly implies that M is the unique stochastically stable class of P ε , in this case. Now assume that the cultures are not radically opposed. In this case,
. By hypothesis, s/m ≤ 1/2, and the cultures are weakly opposed. By Proposition 1 part (ii), the only recurrence classes of P 0 are the conventions and recurrent miscoordination M. Hence the stochastically stable classes are among these (Young 1993 ). The perturbed process P ε can transit from a state in one recurrence class to a state in another, with a sequence of erroneous plays.
Define the resistance r(h, M) of the transition h → M as the minimum number of errors required for the process to transit from state h to a state in M.
To prove the Proposition, we employ the radius-coradius technique of Ellison (2000) . In our model, the radius of the basin of attraction of M, R(M), is the minimum resistance of a path between a state in M and a convention, or formally:
The coradius of the basin of attraction of M, CR(M), is the maximum resistance of a path between a convention and a state in M: To verify the claim, we first compute R(M). Consider a transition between a state in M and h * x . Suppose that in period t, P ε is in a state in M. For all period t samples then, the sample proportion of any action x ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 is zero. Now suppose the 2-member(s) drawn erroneously play the action x ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 in the next b consecutive periods. Then in period t + b + 1, there is a positive probability that player i ∈ N 1 draws a sample of size s, which contains all b plays of x . Based on this sample, i's expected payoff from playing action x is b/s + δ i,x . Player i's expected payoff from an action x ∈ X 1 \X 2 is always δ i,x . Since the sample proportion of any action x ∈ (X 1 ∩ X 2 )\x is zero, the expected payoff to i from any action x ∈ (X 1 ∩ X 2 )\x , is δ i,x . Because the cultures are weakly opposed, argmax x∈X 1 δ i,x is contained in X 1 \X 2 for all i ∈ N 1 . Therefore, no action x ∈ (X 1 ∩ X 2 )\x is a best reply. Action x is then a best reply for i, for a sample including all b erroneous plays, if b/s+δ i,x ≥ δ i,x for all x ∈ X 1 \X 2 , or equivalently if:
By (1), the minimum number of errors required for x ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 to be a best reply for i is:
Therefore, given b i erroneous plays by a 2-member, there is a positive probability that i ∈ N 1 who is selected to play in period t + b i + 1, samples all b i errors, and plays a best reply x ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 to this sample. There is also a positive probability that i is selected to play in the next s consecutive periods, draws the same sample on each occasion (since s/m ≤ 1/2), and plays the same best reply x ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 every time. It follows directly from the proof of Lemma 2, case 1 (see Appendix), that from this point the process transits to h * x with no further errors.
The minimum number of errors required to transit from a state in M to h * x , across all agents i ∈ N 1 , is b * 1, = min i∈N 1 max x ∈X 1 \X 2 (δ i,x − δ i,x )s = min i∈N 1 max x ∈X 1 \X 2 (δ i,x − δ i,x )s . Similarly, the minimum number of errors for the transition M → h * x , across all i ∈ N 2 , is b * 2, = min i∈N 2 max x ∈X 2 \X 1 (δ i,x − δ i,x )s . Without loss of generality, assume b * 1, < b * 2, for all , 1 ≤ ≤ L, so that b * 1, is the resistance of the transition M → h * x . R(M) is the minimum such resistance over all :
= min
x ∈X 1 ∩X 2 min i∈N 1
( max
We shall now establish an upper bound on CR(M). Consider a transition between h * x and a state in M. Suppose that in period t, P ε is in the x convention ((x , x ), . . . (x , x )).
For all possible period t samples, the sample proportion of action x is one. Now suppose the 2-member(s) drawn erroneously play an action x ∈ X 2 \X 1 in the next b ≤ s consecutive periods. Then in period t + b + 1, there is a positive probability that player i ∈ N 1 draws a sample of size s, which contains all b plays of x . Based on this sample, i's expected payoff from playing action x is (1 − b/s) + δ i,x . Player i's expected payoff from an action x ∈ X 1 \x is δ i,x . So the only possible best replies for i in period t+b+1 are x orx ∈ argmax x∈X 1 δ i,x . [By hypothesis the cultures are weakly opposed, sox / ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 .]
Actionx yields a weakly higher payoff for i than x , for a sample including all b erroneous plays, if δ i,x ≥ (1 − b/s) + δ i,x , or equivalently if:
By (4), the minimum number of errors required forx ∈ X 1 \X 2 to be a best reply for i is:
The second equality follows from the definition ofx. Therefore, given b i or more erroneous plays by a 2-member, there is a positive probability that i ∈ N 1 who is selected to play in period t + b i + 1, samples all b i errors, and plays a best replyx ∈ X 1 \X 2 to this sample. There is also a positive probability that i is selected to play in the next s consecutive periods, draws the same sample on each occasion (since s/m ≤ 1/2), and plays the same best replyx every time. Sincex / ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 and the cultures are weakly opposed, we are in case 2(b) considered in the proof of Lemma 2. It follows that from this point, the unperturbed process P 0 transits to a state in M with positive probability in at most s + m additional periods. Therefore, P ε can with b i errors only, transit from h * x to a state in M.
The minimum number of errors across all i ∈ N 1 required to transit from h * x to a state in M is at most b * * 1, = min i∈N 1 (1−max x ∈X 1 \X 2 (δ i,x −δ i,x ))s = (1−max i∈N 1 (max x ∈X 1 \X 2 δ i,x − δ i,x ))s . Similarly, the minimum number of errors for the transition h * x → M, across all i ∈ N 2 , is at most b * * 2, = (1 − max i∈N 2 (max x ∈X 2 \X 1 δ i,x − δ i,x ))s . Without loss of generality, assume b * * 1, < b * * 2, for all , 1 ≤ ≤ L, so that b * * 1, is an upper bound on the resistance of the transition h * x → M. CR(M) is the maximum such resistance over all . Therefore:
(1 − max i∈N 1 ( max
= (1 − min 
By observation, if δ + δ > 1, there exists an integer s such that inequality (8) is satisfied for all s ≥ s. This establishes the claim, and concludes the proof.
